What do the midterms mean for the US ‘sovereign wealth fund’?

With the Democrats taking control of both chambers of Congress, will the federated ‘sovereign wealth fund’ operated by the US government continue in its current form? (Cornell Watson/Bloomberg)


Salar Ghahramani is a law professor at Penn State University and the founder of Global Policy Advisors LLC, a sovereign wealth fund advisory to asset managers and investment banks.

The Democrats’ takeover of both chambers of Congress in the 2026 midterm elections introduces a new chapter in America’s experiment with sovereign wealth funds. Beyond the political implications, the election raises important questions about the US federal government’s growing role as an investor in private enterprises, the governance of these investments, and their long-term future.

Unlike traditional SWFs, which generally operate through centralised investment institutions, America’s emerging model is distinctly decentralised. What I have characterised as a “federated sovereign wealth fund” uses existing federal agencies and executive authorities to pursue investments that advance national economic and strategic interests. Rather than establishing a single institution resembling Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global or Singapore’s GIC, the United States has relied on a network of governmental actors to deploy capital.

This model allows the government to mobilise existing institutional capabilities and invest in strategic sectors without creating another federal bureaucracy. Yet decentralisation also presents challenges involving accountability, transparency, investment discipline, and the division of authority among participating institutions.

Consider the emerging federal investment portfolio, which was initiated during Donald Trump’s second term. The Department of Commerce has bought a stake of about 10 per cent in semiconductor manufacturer Intel, while the Department of Defense committed $400mn in convertible preferred stock to rare earths producer MP Materials, with a potential ownership stake of around 15 per cent.

Meanwhile, the Department of Energy has negotiated equity interests in Lithium Americas and its Thacker Pass lithium project, while Commerce’s CHIPS Program Office has arranged equity and warrant interests in USA Rare Earth. Beyond these domestic investments, the US International Development Finance Corporation has pursued equity investments in strategic industries abroad.

These transactions illustrate the federated model in practice: multiple federal institutions deploying capital under different statutory authorities, with distinct investment mandates, financing structures, and accountability mechanisms.

With Congress under Democratic control and the White House remaining Republican, these arrangements will face greater scrutiny.

Congress possesses substantial oversight authority, including the ability to conduct hearings, investigate executive branch activities, and enact legislation governing federal investment programs. Its scrutiny could extend beyond financial performance to investment selection, governance arrangements, and their relationship to national policy objectives.

Who determines which companies receive government capital? What criteria guide these decisions? How are conflicts of interest addressed? Who exercises shareholder rights? And who ultimately decides when the government should retain, expand or divest its holdings?

Good governance does not guarantee superior investment returns. Nevertheless, clear mandates, professional management, institutional independence, and credible oversight create conditions conducive to successful long-term outcomes while reducing opportunities for politically motivated transactions.

For strategic investments, success cannot always be measured through financial returns alone. Strengthening domestic supply chains or reducing dependence on foreign suppliers may generate public benefits extending beyond an investment’s balance sheet. Such objectives must nevertheless be articulated beforehand, evaluated systematically, and weighed against their financial costs.

The new Congress will also confront a larger institutional question: what should become of America’s expanding portfolio of federal equity investments?

One possibility is maintaining the federated structure while introducing stronger reporting requirements, independent audits, and standardised governance across participating agencies. This would preserve institutional flexibility while addressing fragmented accountability.

A second possibility is consolidating some or all holdings into a centralised SWF, established through congressional legislation and governed by a professional investment board. Such an institution could improve portfolio coordination and accountability but would raise questions about political independence and the relationship between strategic and commercial objectives.

Early in his second term, Trump issued an executive order directing the Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury, along with the assistant to the president for economic policy, to create a plan for a federal US sovereign wealth fund but since then it has not moved forward.

A third approach would establish a hybrid framework, preserving agency-level investment authority while placing portfolio-wide oversight, reporting and risk management under a common institutional structure.

Each approach involves trade-offs. None should be adopted solely to secure a political victory or repudiate another administration’s policies.

Abrupt divestment or politically-driven restructuring could undermine investment value and disrupt strategic initiatives. Conversely, preserving existing arrangements without meaningful scrutiny risks perpetuating governance weaknesses as the portfolio expands.

Stronger reporting requirements to Congress and to the taxpayers is the most likely scenario over the next two years. In the medium term, however, creating a more traditional SWF— centralised, transparent, and apolitical—would best serve the national interest.

The challenge is not so much about which political party should control America’s sovereign investments. The real question should be whether the United States can establish a durable framework in which elected officials determine public policy objectives while investment professionals exercise disciplined judgment within clearly defined institutional boundaries.

Political power changes hands. Sovereign investments span generations. SWF governance must be built to withstand both.

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